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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLOTTE B. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
DANIEL HAROLD SMITH, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
) CASE No, 860419 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
DANIEL HAROLD SMITH 
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Garfield County, Honorable Don V0 Tibbs, 
District Court Judge 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is being taken from a final judgment awarding a 
divorce, custody of a minor child, and a specific distribution of mar-
ital debts and assets together with an award of child support and al-
imony. Judgment was entered in this matter on or about the 3rd day of 
July, 1986, by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Court Judge, in and 
for the County of Garfield, State of Utah subsequent to a bench trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondent were married in Escalante, Utah, on the 
27th day of July, 19843 One child was born as a result of the parties 
relationship; to wit: Scarlet Rae Smith on July 28, 1984, (R. 1, 12) 
The paternity of said child has never been in issue nor disputed. 
On January 30, 1986, respondent filed a complaint for divorce to-
gether with a sworn affidavit requesting, inter alia, a dissolution of 
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the marriage, custody of the minor child, an award of reasonable child 
support, alimony, a reasonable division of the property and an Order re-
quiring appellant to pay all marital debts, (Rc 2) In response thereto 
appellant filed an answer and counterclaim on February 25, 1986 essentially 
requesting the same relief as respondent. (R. 15) Appellant filed a 
timely reply on March 6, 1986o (R. 16) On March 6, 1986, the court held 
an order to show cause hearing in which it heard arguments from counsel 
for the respective parties for the purpose of entering a temporary support 
order. At said hearing both respondent and appellant were sworn and gave 
evidence regarding their incomes, living accomodations and their respective 
needs. As a result, the court entered a temporary order awarding custody 
of the child to respondent; awarded her temporary use of the mobile home 
together with the use of the parties Pontiac vehicle and ordered appellant 
to pay monthly support payments in the amount of $700.00 per montho The 
court heard evidence that Appellant and his mother had purchased the mobile 
home prior to the marriage and were responsible for the payments thereon, 
and therefore permitted appellant to deduct the trailer payment therefrom 
upon proof of paymento (Ro 22, 27) There was conflicting evidence regard-
appellants income. 
On the 19th day of May 1986, Appellant's mother, Cara Mon Anderson 
filed a notice of interest with the court by which she claimed that several 
of the assets in the parties possession were hers and not marital assets 
of the parties, and further that none of the items were gifts. (Ro 28-30) 
Mrs. Anderson resided in Kansas and was never made a party to the action, 
she did however appear as a witness at trial, infra, In her notice of in-
terest she itemized the following: 
"A. A 1967 Concord trailer, identification number 242280440, 
B. A 1985 trailer home, vehicle identification number KS101949o 
-2-
C. A 1973 Nasu, body type--MB, Vin Number 17682. 
D. A 1972 Ford pick-up Vin Number F10GRN02176o 
E. A 1979 Ford Bronco wagon Vin Number U15HLEB2798, 
F. Various purchases and repairs on vehicles and trailer in the 
amount of $3,524.06 (three thousand five hundred twenty-four 
dollars and six cents). 
G. A kitchen table,, 
He Four kitchen chairs. 
Io Water bed and assessories0 
J. Wood burning stove and assessories. 
Washer. 
Dryero 
Rust colored chair. 
Cocktail table. 
Queen sized hand-made quilt, dark pink and rose in colora 
Hand knitted afghan, blue, white, and tan in color. 
Double bed, box spring mattress, headboard.11 Q. 
(R. 28,29) On the 13th day of June 1986, MrsQ Anderson appeared person-
ally at the trial and rendered testimony regarding her interest in some 
of the above itemsQ (Trial transcript 60-65) (hereinafter the references 
to the trial transcript will be denoted as TT with the respective page 
numbers). She was specifically asked questions about the 1973 Nasu Mobile 
home; the washer and dryer and the wood burning stove. She testified that 
she paid over $800*00 for the washer and dryer (TT 64); still owed $711o00 
on the wood-burning stove (TT 63); paid $900o00 down on the mobile home 
plus a $100.00 payment. (TT 64) She further testified that none of the 
items were gifts. (TT 61) 
On June 13, 1986, this matter was tried before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Court Judge. Respondent appeared and was represented by 
Michael Labrum, appellant was present and represented by R. Clayton Hunts-
man. The evidence established that at the time the parties were married 
respondent was 15 year^of age and appellant was 25 years old. During the 
marriage respondent worked at a cafe for about 8 months and at the time of 
trial was employed at the Escalante Sawmill earning about $714o00 per month 
net income. (TT 11) Throughout the marriage appellant worked for the same 
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sawmill, however his income during the marriage was disputed. Respondent 
testified that his income was between $1400 - $1600 permontho Appellant 
testified that he earned approximately $16,000 in 1985 net pay* (TT 11 and 
47) His W-2 wage and tax statement showed $20,302o80 for 1985. (R-18) 
He indicated that amount was unusually higher than average owing primarily 
to a substantial amount of overtime he was able to put in as a result of 
a capital expansion of the mill0 (TT 48) Appellant testified that his 
average net income was less than $1100o00 per month for a 40 hour week as 
evidenced by his net earnings for the preceeding three months, to wit: 
March $1,050.58; April $921G37; and May $l,023o43o (TT 47) 
Immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this matter, the 
parties acquired a 1981 Pontiac TransAm Firebird costing approximately 
$5,600o00o (Rol4) In order to purchase said vehicle Appellant traded in 
a vehicle given to him by his step-father for a down payment of $2,362025 
leaving a balance of $3,552,75 owing to General Motors Acceptance Corpor-
ation payable in monthly installments of $178092 for 24 months,, 
At trial respondent introduced a list of assets and liabilities which 
had been prepared by her. (TT 20,21; Plaintiff's Exhibit 12) When asked 
what it was she testified "Well, it's the stuff that we had while we was 
married." (TT 19) Respondent further testified that the values set out 
represented the fair market value of the items and the fair debt owed on 
each. (TT 19) She also indicated a preference as to who should receive 
what. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12) The following is essentially what repondeni 
submitted to the court as such: 
ASSET FAIR MARKET VALUE FAIR VALUE OF DEBT 
Home (1973 Mobile Home) $8,000 $8,000 
Furniture-Appliances 1,500 None 
1981 Pontiac 4,300 3,000 
1979 Ford Bronco 5,500 None 
Camper trailer 2,500 None 
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Trailer 
Motorcycle 
Camper Shell 
12 Acres Arizona Property 
Guns 
Tools 
Color TV 
Black and White TV 
Stereo 
Records 
Woodburning Stove 
1978 Ford flatbed 
1972 Ford Pick Up 
1,500 
50 
150 
? 
? 
2,500 
150 
50 
100 
100 
1,000 
1,500 
? 
None 
None 
None 
? 
? 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Respondent was asked if prior to trial she had an opportunity to review 
the list of items prepared by Mrs. Anderson to which she responded in the 
affirmative. And, when asked if some of those items were in her home she 
answered yes0 (TT 21) Respondent admitted that many of the items were in 
fact purchased by Mrs. Anderson whom expected repayment. (TT 22) Nowhere 
in respondent's testimony did she claim that her and appellant had purchased 
any of the above property with marital income, except as follows: K pay-
ments made on the mobile home; 20 car payments on the Pontiac TransAm; 
and 3o a $100.00 payment to Mrs. Anderson on account. It is noteworthy 
that neither respondent nor appellant testified they had any interest in 
the property included in Mrs. Anderson's notice of interest, (supra) ex-
cept payments made on the mobile home, which respondent indicated there was 
no equity0 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12) 
During triaL documentary evidence was introduced demonstrating that 
Mrs. Anderson was purchasing numerous materials for the mobile home in 
question, beginning May 22, 1984 through February 1986, (Defendant's Exhi-
bits 6-A - 6-J) These expenditures were for permanent improvements, acces-
sories, and repairs for the home. Defendant proffered receipts for other 
household furniture showing purchases by MrsQ Anderson of items in the home0 
(TT 39) With respect to the vehicles and trailers listed by Mrs. Anderson, 
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counsel for appellant sought to demonstrate that the parties lacked any 
interest in them by introducing the titles. For instancea concerning 
the camp trailer which respondent listed as a marital asset having a val-
ue of $2,500 the following exchange took place: 
"Mr. Huntsman: All right. Exhibit 1. Your Honor, is a document, 
State of Kansas Certificate of Title for a 1967 Concord trailer, 
No. 242280040c 
The Court: Just a moment, please. Do you have any objection to 
Exhibit NOo 1? 
Mr. Labrum: Is this the trailer they1re living in now? 
Mr. Huntsman: No. 
The Court: Where is it? What are we talking about? 
Mr. Labrum: I don't even know, Your Honor0 That's what I'm trying 
to get ato 
The Court: Why are you offering it? 
Mr. Huntsman: I understand this was claimed by the Plaintiff, I may 
be mistaken. 
Mr. Labrum: The only trailer we're claiming, Your Honor, is the 1973 
mobile home that she's living inG 
The Court: I'm not going to receive it. It's irrelevant." 
(TT 35). And again regarding the trailer which respondent listed as a 
marital asset with a value of $1,500 (supra) in response to questions by 
Appellants counsel respondent testified as follows: (TT 32) 
"Q A flat trailer. Are you familiar with that vehicle? 
A A flat trailer, the one that hauls the other vehicles? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. I'm familiar with thatQ 
Q And do you know whose name that's in? 
A Yes. In his mothers. 
Q And isn't the same thing the case with the other trailer home, the 
14 foot by 66 foot? 
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Mr. Brown: (sic) I'm going to object, Your Honor* It's immaterial0 
We're making no claim of ownership on those items. The only one we're 
claiming is the '73 Fleetwood, (sic) which has been covered.1' 
Nowhere in the record does respondent adduce any factual basis that any of 
of the property claimed by Mrs. Anderson was subject to a marital interest. 
Respondent submitted a monthly expenses and 'income estimate. (TT 
15; Plaintiff's Exhibit 9) She testified that she earned $700.00 take 
home pay per month and would require an additional $450.00 per month to 
maintain her self and child. In addition, respondent indicated that with 
a total of $1150 per month she could make both the mobile home and car 
payment. (TT 26) Appellant testified as to his income which he indicated 
averaged less than $1100 per month net. (TT 47) He further advised the 
court that he was living with his grandparents and paying them about $150 
per month; needed at least $100 per month for food; had many other expenses; 
$150 for gas; $163 for a payment on the Bronco at the very minimum,, (TT 
49-51) Adding to those amounts monthly child support of $170 (not herein 
contested) Appellant's minimal support level is $733 per month which doesn't 
cover any other obligations. Moreover, appellant testified that he was 
presently sleeping on his grandparents couch and had to contribute to 
their expenses because they were retired and only received $400.00 per month 
income. (R 50) In addition, appellant testified that he would need to 
purchase clothing plus utilities as soon as he found a place to live be-
cause he couldn't stay with his grandparents ^/ery much longer. (R 51) 
He further indicated that during the preceeding three months he had to 
borrow over $3,000.00 from his mother to pay his wife temporary support 
and alimony in the amount of $700.00 per month as ordered by the court. 
To make problems worse, appellant has been ordered to pay all marital-
debt to include his mother and hold respondent harmless *ter&farora(F(R;:4)5J. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUS 
AND INEQUITABLE TO THE APPELLANT 
POINT II 
THE ALIMONY AWARD MADE BY THE COURT WAS INAPPROPRIATE, UNNECESSARY 
AND INEQUITABLE TO THE APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Respondent was awarded property which arguably did not belong to the 
marital estate, and for which appellant was ordered to pay and otherwise 
hold respondent harmless from0 The court included property owned by 
third parties in it's findings of fact which the court found to be marital 
assets and improperly assigned those assets to the parties. Without first 
ascertaining what the marital assets were,,the court could not begin to 
make an equitable distribution between the parties of marital property. 
Further, and probably as a consequence, the court did not ascribe any value 
to the property it awarded. The result was that respondent received pro-
perty which belonged to a third person far and beyond the value of the pro-
perty the parties owned. The court totally ignored the record and the evi-
dence adduced at trial in rendering such a finding which apparently was un-
controverted. The result was so lopsided in favor of respondent (an 18 
year old mother) that appellant submits he was being punished. 
POINT II 
As an interrelated aspect of the above, the trial court ordered the 
appellant to pay off certain debts and obligations resulting from it's a-
ward of the property which was otherwise an extremely confusing award"of a 
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mony. The award of alimony was interwoven into the court's schematic 
albiet inappropriate division of property. The court in effect placed 
respondent in a much better financial position that she was before the 
divorce, completely in disregard of appellant* The end result of both 
the division of property and the alimony award,consistent with the court's 
findings, left appellant in a position from which he will not forseeably 
extricate himself. In essence, the court gave respondent everything and 
much more while at the same time ordering appellant to pay substantially 
more than he could reasonably earn and further leaving him without any as-
sets from which he could fall back on. Respondent's general position 
with respect to finances and needs were in fact improved. She, at the time 
of divorce was gainfully employed and earning over $700o00 per month net 
income. Appellant's ability to provide support, <as a direct result of 
the court's property division was nearly eradicated. The evidence demon-
strated that appelltant averaged less than $1100o00 per month. The court's 
findings of fact attributed a $1500o00 per month figure to defendant, but 
were not supported by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION MADE BY 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUS AND 
INEQUITABLE TO THE APPELLANT 
The general rule concerning appeals from property distributions in 
divorce cases is stated in Pope v. Pope, 589 P0 2d 752 (Utah 1978) at 
page 753 is: 
"The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable latitude 
of discretion in adjusting financial and property interestsQ A 
party appealing therefrom has the burden to prove there was a mis-
understanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderates a-
gainst the findings; or such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
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manifest a clear abuse of discretion.,f 
However, as was stated in Read v0 Read, 594 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979): 
"When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is to consider the var-
ious factors relating to the situation and to arrange the best pos-
sible allocation of the property and the economic resources of the 
parties so that the parties and their children can pursue their 
lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible. If it appears 
that the decree is so discordant with an equitable allocation that 
it will more likely lead to further difficulties and distress than 
to serve the desired objective, then a reappraisal of the decree 
must be undertaken." 594 P02d at 872. 
Given these principles of review and obligations of the trial court, 
it becomes clear that the property division made in this case is not only 
in error but the result is that of manifest injustice to appellant. The 
facts adduced at trial of this matter, and the uncontroverted evidence 
unfortunately demonstrated that there was simply very little, if any, mar-
ital property of the parties to divide. The record in this case clearly 
indicates that during the marriage substantially more marital debt was ac-
crued than property. 
After only 18 months of marriage respondent herein filed for divorce, 
which was granted about 6 months thereafter0 At the time the parties were 
married respondent was 15 years old and gave birth to a daughter the next 
day. Appellant was 25 years of age and worked at the local sawmill. Nei-
ther party has finished high school or received any special vocational 
training. Respondent 'testified that at times during the marriage she was 
able to secure work at the local cafe but was only able to earn about $300. 
Appellant indicated that he continued working at the sawmill throughout the 
marriage and owing to substantial overtime (13-14 hours a day) was able to 
earn approximately $16,000 during 1985. However prior to the capital ex-
pansion made that year, and subsequent thereto.,..he neyer earned more than 
,$1100 net incofne.> The fact is that duHng the parties marriage 
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they were living above their means0 Respondent's father provided some 
land for them if they could secure a mobile home. (TT 54) The parties 
were then successful in obtaining the use of a mobile home from Appellants 
mother. From nearly the outset of their marriage the parties prevailed 
upon Cara Mon Anderson (Appellant's mother) for financial assistance. 
As the record indicates, she obliged by purchasing nearly all of the pro-
perty in possession of the parties. There was never a question as to her 
intent in the minds of the parties or hers. Mrs. Anderson insisted upon 
being secured in her investments or payed backo She scrupuously kept 
receipts for every item and was holding the parties accountable therefore. 
Upon learning of the pending divorce she sought to protect her interests 
by filing with the court a notice of interest itemizing each piece of pro-
perty she had purchased, together with the property she owned prior to the 
marriage. Further, at time of trial she insisted upon appearing to testify 
before the court in order to secure same* It should be noted that although 
Mrs. Anderson presently resides in Kansas, she previously lived in Escalante 
Utah where her parents still reside. At trial neither party contested 
her asserted ownership of the items she listed. She personally appeared be-
fore the court with sufficient documentation to establish all right-title 
and interest in herself of those items she listed. 
The court and counsel for both parties were aware of her interest at 
the time of trial as evidenced by the following exchange: (TT 4) 
"Mr. Labrum: Your Honor, may I add just one more thing? There1s also 
been a notice of interest filed by Mrs0 Karamont Anderson (sic) who 
is the mother of the Defendant. 
The Court: I noticed it in the fileG Do you claim that property? 
Mr. Labrum: We're claiming a 1973 Fleetwood (sic) Mobile Home, Your 
Honor, that was purchased for the parties and the parties have been 
making the payments on it, and a 1981 Pontiac automobile, the furn-
ishings and appliances in the mobile hc^me. 
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The Court: So you are claiming it? 
Mr, Labrum: Well, the list is very extensive* I don't know if he's 
talking about for example, the same washer and dryer, or a different 
washer and dryerQ 
The Court: Well, she isn't a party to this lawsuit so far as I'm 
concerned, if she wants to file a seperate lawsuit, that's up to 
her. As for the property that you claim as part of the marriage 
I'll be making a decree on it. If someone else owns it they can come 
in and claim it and file a seperate lawsuit. That's all there is to 
that because as far as I'm concerned, she's not a party to the law-
suit. " 
It would appear axiomatic and fundamental that before a trial court could 
equitably divide the marital property of the parties in a divorce, it must 
first ascertain what that property consists of0 In the instant case, the 
court awarded Appellant several items of property which never belonged to 
the parties, to wit: 12 acres of property in Arizona. In the court's find-
ings of fact and subsequent Judgment the court awarded Appellant a substan-
tial amount of property in which neither respondent or appellant ever had* 
or claimed to have an interest. (Refo paragraph 11G Findings of Fact and 
paragraph 7. in the Decree) In addition and quite understandably, the court 
failed to attach any values to any of the items of property in it's Findings 
of Fact and Decree. In Jones v. Jones, 700 PQ 2d 1072 (Utah 1985) this 
Court addressed a similar problem concerning a lack of values and stated: 
' To avoid problems of this nature, we require that when one of the 
parties to a property distribution raises a serious question as to 
the value of one or more of the assets, the trial court's distribu-
tion of those assets should be based upon written findings of fact 
that will permit appellate review." (cite ommitted) 700 P. 2d at 1074* 
Further, in the Jones case the Court observed: 
"Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand 
for findings on the specific value of the assets. In this case, how-
ever, the wife's attorney prepared the inadequate findings of fact 
she challenges on appeal . . . " 700 P0 2d at 1074, 
The court in this case neglected to make any findings regarding values 
of the assets it awarded. (TT 68-73) 
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Contrary to all the controverting evidence adduced at trial and as 
briefly described in the facts (supra) the court awarded respondent the 
mobile home together with all furnishings and appliances, including, but 
not limited to, the washer and dryer, wood burning stove, kitchen table, 
and chairs, rust colored chair, cocktail table, double bed box springs 
and headboard, 1981 Pontiac automobile, color television. In addition, 
the court ordered Appellant to pay an equivalent amount of alimony as 
and for the debt owed on the mobile home ($8,000) and the Pontiac ($3,000)* 
(Ref. Point II infra.) Further, the court ordered Appellant to assume 
and satisfy all debts incurred during the m&rriage including, but not 
limited to, his mother and one Blake Robinsbn,of Valley Home. 
At the time of trial respondent was gainfully employed at the same 
sawmill as appellant and earning at least $700 permonth net and the court 
so found. The court further found that appellant had an earning capacity 
of $1500 per month net which appellant submits was not supported by the 
evidence. Respondent was allowed to testify over objection that she thought 
appellant's income was between 1400 and 1600 per month. If this figure 
was gross income it might be supported by other evidence. However, as the 
court found 1500 per month reflected net earnings; it's finding cannot be 
supported by the record. Respondent testified that in 1985 he earned about 
$16,000 net income ($1,333 per month) which was exceptionally high owing 
to a one time expansion of the mill. In fact Appellant earned a total 
net income of $15,114.35 in 1985 ($1,259035 per month) as verified by his 
W-2 wage and tax statement (Plaintiff's Exhibits 10 & 11 and R. 18) In 
addition, appellant testified that in March 1986 he netted $1,050.58; 
$921.37 in April; and $1,023.43 in May of 1986, He further testified that 
these figures were normal. In Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d 564 (Utah 1985) 
addressing a fluctuating income problem, this Court stated: "We have held 
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that where the husband has experienced a temporary decrease in income, 
his historical earnings must be taken into account in determining the 
amount of alimony to be paid." (cites ommitted) 704 P. 2d at 566. Res-
pondent submits this case represents the exact opposite of Jones, that 
is, he experienced a temporary increase during 1985. In any event the 
court's finding of $1500 net income per month is simply unrealistic and 
not supported by the record. 
With respect to the court's duty to make a fair and equitable divi-
sion of the property this Court developed a general formula to insure all 
relevant factors were considered. In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 
523, 236 P. 2d 1066 (1951) the Court delineated 15 factors to be consider-
ed in adjusting the right and obligations of the parties,. Subsequently 
the Court has retreated from any fixed rule or formula in determining an 
appropriate distribution of a marital estate* In Turner v. Turner, 649 
P. 2d 6 (Utah 1982) at page 8 the Court summarized the MacDonald criteria: 
" . . . the respective wages of the parties; what each may have given 
up for the marriage; what money or property each put into the mar-
riage; the physical and mental health of the parties; the relative 
ability, training and education of the parties; the duration of the 
marriage; the present income of the parties; the efforts exerted by 
the parties in acquiring marital property; the present mental and 
physical age of the parties; the life expectancy of the parties; the 
the ability of the wife to provide income for herself; and the abili-
ty of the husband to provide support*" 
And, more recently this Court noted: 
11
 That principle of equity has survived evolving changes in domes-
t i c matters. In the distr ibut ion of matfcital estate there is no 
fixed rule or formula, (c i te omitted) Within certain l imi ts that 
have been set by this Court, the t r i a l court may make such orders 
in relation to the parties as may be equitable." (c i te omitted) 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P. 2d 781 (Utah 1986) at page 782. 
Appellant submits that the distribution of assets and obligations 
made by the court in this matter is so unreasonably disproportionate 
-14-
and one sided:that it smacks of a penalty or punitive measure taken against 
him by the trial court contrary to principles established by this Court. 
Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979) Essentially the trial court awarded 
respondent all of the property of the parties, and, if encumbered by debt, 
ordered appellant to pay it off (albiet via alimony), and further to as-
sume all other marital debts and obligationSo Respondent submits the court 
even went so far as to award respondent property that belonged to his mother 
and step-father (Mr. Charles Anderson) and ordered appellant to pay for 
same. Additionally, the trial court found that ". . . the parties have ac-
cumulated the following property during the marriage which should be award-
to the Defendant:" (Ref No. 11 Findings of Fact) and thereupon described 
a substantial amount of property in which neither party to the marriage had 
any interest whatever. Further, the only property that was awarded to 
appellant by the court which did not belong to someone else was property he 
owned prior to the marriage. Appellant contends that the division of 
the marital property and debts made in this matter was not only erroneous, 
inequitable and unfair but was completely unsupported by the evidence. 
.As will bee'.noted jjnder Point II infra if appellant is required to-
pay for the'home of the parties'put of his future earnings, while respon-
dent enjoys, the exclusive possession thereof, equity and fairness would 
suggest that upon the occurance of 1. her death; 2. sale of same; 3. her 
remarriage or cohabitation; that appellant deceive a one-half interest. 
POINT II 
THE ALIMONY AWARD MADE BY THE JOURT 
WAS INAPPROPRIATE, UNNECESSARY AND 
INEQUITABLE TO THE APPELLANT 
Appellant herewith incorporates that pdrtion of his argument as set 
forth in Point I above as it may relate to the subject of the award of 
alimony in this case0 
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As was stated by this Court in Stephens v. Stephens, 45 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (1986) at page 14: 
"To the extent that plaintiff's argument attempts to assail the a-
ward of alimony per se, we have repeatedly stated that the trial 
court has broad discretion in matters of alimony, and its decision 
will not be disturbed so long as it is exercised in accordance with 
the standard that has been set by this Court. Jones v» Jones, 700 
P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985)" 
And, in the Jones case at page 1075: 
"This Court has described the purpose of alimony: "The most impor-
tant function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as near-
ly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage 
and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. 
English, 565 P.2d at 411. With purpose in mind, the Court in English 
articulated three factors that must be considered in fixing a reas-
onable alimony award: 
1. the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
2. the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for her-
self; and 
3. the ability of the husband to provide support." 
It should be noted at the outset of the ensuing argument that the a-
ward of alimony in this case is and necessarily must be inextricably woven 
within the context of the objectionable division of property awarded in 
this case as more particularly set out in Point I aboveQ For the sake of 
simplicity this argument will assume that the division of property contains 
within the decree is correct. 
In this case the lower court entered the following pertinent findings 
of fact: 
"8. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony in the amount of 
the debt owing on the mobile home of the parties, which debt is o-
wing to Bank of Iron County, Escalante, Utah, together with the a-
mount of the debt owing on the 1981 Pontiac automobile to GMAC, 
which debts equal approximately $11,000.00 and said alimony shall 
be payable as follows: 
a. $275.00 per month until the debt owing on the mobile home 
or the equivalent amount thereof is satisfied in fullo Said 
amount to be payable to the Bank of Iron County, Escalante, 
Utah, so long as the debt remains owing thereto and thereaf-
ter to the Plaintiff0 
b. $150o00 per month payable directly to the Plaintiff, $75o00 
on the 5th of each month and $75.00 on the 20th of each month 
until the debt owing to GMAC or the equivalent thereof is satis-
fied in full. ,r 
c. Said alimony shall not terminate until Defendant has sa-
tisfied the debts or paid the equivalent amount to the Plain-
tiff." 
With respect to the first factor, i.eG the financial condition and 
needs of the respondent: Respondent testified she was gainfully employed 
and earning a net income of $700.00 per montho She further produced an 
exhibit prepared by her counsel, under her supervision, which detailed 
and itemized her monthly expenses and incomeo (Plaintifffs Exhibit NoQ9) 
She listed her total monthly expenses at $1,161.00, which included both the 
house payment and the car payment.($275o00 and $178.42 respectively). In 
addition to her income she was awarded $170o00 per month for child support 
giving her a total income of $870.00o Using her own figures respondent 
would accordingly require $292.00 per month to continue living in the same 
style in which she did during the marriage except the car and the house 
would be exclusively hers. .Further, respondent has no other debts or ob-
ligations because Appellant was ordered to pay them* 
Turning to the second factor, her ability to produce a sufficient in-
come for herself: Respondent is 18years old, has her own car, exclusive use 
and possession of her own home which is completely furnished and has se-
cured meaningful employment. She is in excellent mental and physical health 
which suggests a very optimistic life. 
The third factor in this analysis creats some serious problemsQ As 
noted above, appellants average monthly income appears to be less than 
$1100.00 net. Minus child support he has $930o00. He further testified 
that he need*$150 per month just to live with his grandparents; plus ap-
proximately $100.00 for food; $150 for gas; jand, $163 for a payment on his 
vehicle. Subtracting these amounts out he is left with $367.00. He also 
testified that he needed money for clothing and indicated that he would 
soon have to quit sleeping on his grandparents coucho In any event at 
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some later time he would have to get a place of his own, and then he 
would have to pay utilities, etc. The point is that appellant no long-
er has a place of his own to live in, and must therefore begin from scratch. 
In addition, he was ordered to pay all marital debts the amount of which 
was not specified in the record. He was specifically ordered to repay 
his mother for all the money she lent the parties during the marriage and 
for the purchases she made for the benefit of marital assets (see above)* 
Given this state of financial affairs the trial court ordered appellant 
to pay alimony in the amount of $425.00. Given the fact that at the very 
most he would have is $367.00 (noted above). It would appear that the tria" 
courts order for alimony under these facts is a clear abuse of discretion,, 
Appellant is without any property to sell and cannot possibly earn enough 
to satisfy his obligations. If the present alimony award in this case is 
left undisturbed respondent will certainly be predestined to respond to 
orders to show cause time and time again under pain of contempt; just as 
predictably incur liability for attorney's fees which will agrevate the pro-
blem. 
In Higley v0 Higley, 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1983) this Court said: 
"An alimony award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close 
as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.11 
676 P. 2d at 381. 
The foregoing amply demonstrates what the trial court chose to ignore. 
The direct effect of such an award of alimony in this case clearly places 
respondent in a higher standard of living than she was before at the ex-
pense of appellantc On the other hand appellant is destituteQ Faced with 
such an impossible and imposing situation experts predict a "fight or fligh 
response. Under the guise of equity the trial court has created an intol-
erable situation for not only appellant, but respondent, the minor child 
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of the parties together with their parents and relatives. 
It again should be noted that the foregoing argument assumes that the 
trial courts division of property was corrept. Appellant completely dis-
putes and contests same. However, because the trial court entered it's 
findings regarding alimony in such a fashion the division of property is 
difficult to completely segregate, which in turn leads to confusion when 
application of different legal standards and guidlines are applied. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The failure to properly ascertain the marital property of the par-
ties in this matter effectively precluded aijiy equitable division thereof. 
20 The erroneous inclusion of property owned by third parties in 
the marital estate and a subsequent division which included that property 
was a misapplication of the law which seriously prejudiced appellant's int-
terests and resulted in an unfair division of property. 
3. Failure of the court to place any values upon the property pre-
cludes any fair and meaningful appraisal of the division the court made. 
4. The court lacked sufficient evidence to substantiate its findings 
of fact and abused its discretion in choosing to ignore the evidence pre-
sented regarding ownership of property, income levels of appellant, and in 
failing to ascertain marital debt. 
5. The court erred in entering an alimony award in favor of respondent 
in view of the foregoing problems, and that any award of alimony under 
these circumstances is inappropriate, unnecessary, and inequitable. 
6. The award of the parties home together with furniture and appliance 
to respondent and ordering appellant to pay for same out of his future 
income without giving him a future interest in same constituted error0 
7. The division of property and award of alimony in this matter is so 
disproportionate in favor of respondent as to suggest the court was attemp-
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ting to punish the defendant which is inappropriate in domestic proceed-
ings and was therefore reversible errorQ 
Because of the foregoing and the consequences flowing therefrom, 
respondent respectfully requests this Court to exercise it's power under 
the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, and make an appropriate 
modification of the Decree in this case for the reasons specified by 
Chief Justice Crockett in Read v. Read, 594 PQ 2d 871 (Utah 1979) in his 
dissenting opinion at page 873 and 874. If such is not possible, res-
pondent submits he is entitled to have the matters addressed herein reversec 
and the case remanded with appropriate instructions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 1987. 
BENJAMIN Pa KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant Danial Harold Smith, were served upon 
Michael R. Labrum, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent by hand delivering 
same on the 22nd day of January 1987Q 
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MICHAEL R. LABRUM (18b8) 
LABRUM $ TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
108 NORTH MAIN 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 34701 
TELEPHONE: (801) 896-6484 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLOTTE B. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL HAROLD SMITH, 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter having come before the above entitled 
Court for trial on the 13tn day of June, 1986, before the Honorable Don 
V. TiDbs, District Judge presiding; the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
represented by counsel, Michael R. Labrum, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and represented by counsel, R. Clayton Huntsman; and the parties 
having presented evidence in support of their respective positions and 
the Court Having neard the testimony and having examined the evidence and 
files herein, now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 Tne Plaintiff is and lias been a natural and bona fide 
resident of Garfield County, State of Utah, for more than three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
i. Plaintiff married the Defendant on July 27, 1984, at 
Escalante, Utah. 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO; 1 l y / ' f i y FILED 
•J'JL 11 1986 
CLERK 
IMUOLOU 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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- Defendant has treated Plaintiff cruelly, causing her great 
emotional distress and suffering^ 
5. One child has been born as issue of the marriage, to wit: 
Scarlet Rae Smith, born July 28, 1984. 
6. Plaintiff is the fit and proper person to be awarded the 
care, custody and control of the minor child Scarlet Rae, subject only to 
Defendant' s right to reasonable visitation. Defendant snould be required 
to give twenty-four hours notice of his intent to exercise visitation and 
should not exercise an/ visitation while under the influence of any 
alconol or drugs. 
7. Plaintiff has an earning capacity of $700.00 per montn and 
Defendant has an earning capacity of $1,500.00 and that based upon those 
incomes, a reasonable child support is the sum of $170.00 per month, 
wnich sum should be paid one-haIf on the 5th and one-hal£ on the 20th of 
each and every month. 
8. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony in the amount 
of tne debt owing on the mobile home of the parties, which debt is owing 
to BanK of Iron County, Escalante, Utah, togetner with tne amount of the 
debt owing on the 1981 Pontiac automobile to GMAC, which debts equal 
approximately $11,000.00 and said alimony shall be payable as follows: 
a. $275.00 per month until tne debt owing on the mobile 
home or tne equivalent amount thereof is satisfied in full. 
Said amount to oe payaole to tne Bank of Iron County, Escaiante, 
Utan, so long as tne debt remains owing thereto and thereafter 
to the Plaintiff. 
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b. $150.00 per month payable directly to the Plaintiff, 
$75.00 on the 5th of each month and $75.00 on the 20th of each 
month until the debt owing to GMAC or the equivalent thereof is 
satisfied in full. 
c. Said alimony shall not terminate until Defendant has 
satisfied the debts or paid the equivalent amount to the 
Plaintiff. 
9. Defendant is in arrears under a temporary order for support 
in the amount of $734.00 and the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment 
against Defendant for said arrearages. 
10. The Court finds that the parties have accumulated the 
following property during the marriage which should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff: 
1973 Governor Mobile home presently located on property owned by 
Plaintiff's father. Plaintiff is specifically ordered to 
attempt to refinance tne obligation owing thereon and remove 
Defendant and Defendant's mother from any liability with 
respect thereto and to hold said parties harmless therefrom. 
All furnishings and appliances in the mobile home, unless 
specifically excluded hereinafter including, but not limited to, 
the washer and dryer, wood burning stove, kitchen table and 
chairs, rust colored chair, cocktail table, double bed box 
springs and headboard, 1981 Pontiac automobile, color television, 
Plaintiff1 s personal effects and paraphernalia. 
11. The Court finds that the parties have accumulated the 
following property during the marriage which shopld be awarded to the 
Defendant: 
1978 Ford flatbed 
1972 Ford pickup 
1979 Ford bronco 
Camp trailer 
Trailer 
<3 
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Honda motorcycle 
Camper shell 
12 acres o£ property in Arizona 
Guns 
Mechanic tools 
Black and white television 
Stereo 
Records 
Waterbed and accessories 
Hand knitted afghan 
Defendant's personal effects and paraphernalia 
12. The parties specifically agree to exchange the hand made 
quilts. The Defendant should be entitled to receive the dark pink and 
rose and the Plaintiff should be entitled to receive the blue colored 
quilt. 
13. Defendant should be ordered to assume and satisfy all debts 
incurred during the marriage except those owing on the mobile home and 
1981 Pontiac including, but not limited to, debts owing to Defendant's 
mother and Blake Robinson. 
14. Defendant snould be required to maintain healtn, medical 
and dental insurance so long as it is provided by his employment, and the 
parties snould divide equally any and ail expenses not covered by said 
insurance. If healtn, accident or dental insurance is not available to 
Defendant but is available to Plaintiff through her employment, then 
Plaintiff snould maintain the insurance and any expenses not covered by 
said insurance should be divided equally between the parties. In the 
event neither party has available tnrough employment nealth insurance of 
tne nature above stated, tnen eacn of the parties should assuirie one-half 
of any and all medical and dental expenses. 
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Plaintiff should further be required to not if/ the Defendant of 
anything other tnan normal medical expenses that might be incurred for 
tne benefit of the minor child; and should she fail to notify the 
Defendant, Defendant shall not be liable thereoii. 
15. Each party should be required to assume and satisfy their 
separate attorney1s fees and costs incurred herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of this matter. 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce which 
decree siiall become absolute and final upon the expiration of three 
months from the date hereof. 
3. The Court should authorize mandatory income withholding for 
delinquent child support pursuant to UCA §78-45d-l et seq. 
DATED this 3 *~day of J u ^ 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
ys 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
,: v 3 / 4 ^ FILED No; 
MICHAEL R. LABRUM (.1868) 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
108 NORTH MAIN 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: (801) 896-6484 
C^Zmu. £&bm&w 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLOTTE 6. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL HAROLD SMITH, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 3154 
The above entitled matter naving come before the above entitled 
Court for trial on the 13th day of June, 1986, before the Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs, District Judge presiding; the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
represented b/ counsel, Michael R. Labrum, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and represented by counsel, R. Clayton Huntsman; and the parties 
having presented evidence in support of their respective positions and 
the Court naving neard the testimony and having examined the evidence and 
files herein, and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
DECREE 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from 
Defendant which decree shall become final upon the expiration of three 
months from the date hereof. 
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2. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the 
parties1 minor child, to wit: Scarlet Rae Smith, oorn July 28, 1984. 
Defendant is awarded reasonable visitation and is required to give 
twenty-four hours notice of his intent to exercise visitation and shall 
not exercise any visitation while under the influence of any alcohol or 
drugs. 
3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant a reasonable child 
support in tne amount of $170.00 per month, which sum shall be paid 
one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each and every month. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded alimony in the amount of the debt 
owing on the mobile home of the parties, which debt is owing to Bank of 
Iron County, Escaiante, Utah, together with the amount of the debt owing 
on tne 1981 Pontiac automobile to GMAC, wnich debts equal approximately 
$11,000.00 and said alimony shall be payable as follows: 
a. $275.00 per month until the debt owing on the mobile 
home or the equivalent amount thereof is satisfied in full. 
Said amount to be payaole to the BanK. of Iron County, Escaiante, 
Utah, so long as the debt remains owing thereto and thereafter 
to the Plaintiff. 
o. $150.00 per month payable directly to the Plaintiff, 
$75.00 on the 5th of each month and $75.00 on the 20th of each 
montn until the debt owing to GMAC or the equivalent thereof is 
satisfied in full. 
c. Said alimony shall not terminate until Defendant has 
satisfied the debts or paid the equivalent amount to the 
Plaintiff. 
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5. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against Defendant for 
arrearages under a temporary order for support in the amount of $734.00. 
6. The Plaintiff is awarded the following property: 
1973 Governor Mobile home presently located on property owned by 
Plaintiff's father. Plaintiff is specifically ordered to 
attempt to refinance the obligation owing thereon and remove 
Defendant and Defendant's mother from any liability with 
respect thereto and to hold said parties harmless therefrom. 
All furnishings and appliances in the mobile home, unless 
specifically excluded hereinafter including, but not limited to, 
the washer and dryer, wood burning stove, kitchen table and 
chairs, rust colored chair, cocktail table, double bed box 
springs and headboard, 1981 Pontiac automobile, color television, 
Plaintiff's personal effects and paraphernalia. 
7. The Defendant is awarded the following property: 
1978 Ford flatbed 
1972 Ford pickup 
1979 Ford bronco 
Camp trailer 
Trailer 
Honda motorcycle 
Camper shell 
12 acres of property in Arizona 
Guns 
Mechanic tools 
Black and white television 
Stereo 
Records 
Waterbed and accessories 
Hand knitted afghan 
Defendant's personal effects and paraphernalia 
8. The Defendant is awarded the dark pink and rose quilt and 
the Plaintiff is awarded the blue colored quilt. 
9. Defendant is ordered to assume and satisfy all debts 
incurred during the marriage except those owing on the mobile home and 
1981 Pontiac and including, but not limited to, debts owing to 
Defendant's mother and Blake Robinson. 
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10, Defendant is required to maintain health, medical and 
dental insurance so long as it is provided by his employment, and the 
parties snail divide equally any and all expenses not covered Dy said 
insurance. If health, accident or dental insurance is not available to 
Defendant but is available to Plaintiff through her employment, then 
Plaintiff shall maintain the insurance and any expenses not covered by 
said insurance shall be divided equally between the parties. In the 
event neither party has health insurance of the nature above stated 
available througn employment, then each of tiie parties shall assume 
one-half of any and all medical and dental expenses. 
Plaintiff is required to notify the Defendant of anything other 
than normal medical expenses that might be incurred for the benefit of 
the minor child and should she fail to notify the Defendant, Defendant 
snail not be liable thereon. 
11. Each party is ordered to assume and satisfy their separate 
attorney' s fees and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this 3 day of Julfe' 1986. 
/ BY 1HE COURT 
DON V. TIBBS>jnjTRICT JUDGE 
